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VOLUME 47 WINTER 1972 NUMBER 2
MILITARY JURIES: CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND THE
NEED FOR REFORM*
JOSEPH REMcHOt
In a long line of cases the Supreme Court has consistently protected
and expanded the right of the criminal defendant to trial by an impartial
jury of his peers.' The Court has been particularly attentive to the right
of minority group members to be tried by juries from which members of
their group have not been excluded.2
In 1968 the Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana that the
right to trial by jury is so fundamental that it extends, as a constitutional
matter, to persons tried in state as well as in federal' courts. In the same
year Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968," de-
claring as a matter of national policy not only that all litigants in federal
courts who are entitled to a jury shall have the right to "juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community,"5 but also that
"all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on
grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States."6 Most
recently the Court has characterized trial by jury as the citizen's bulwark
against "oppression by the Government."7  This characterization is
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Prof. Charles R. Nesson of the
Harvard Law School and to Prof. Edward F. Sherman of the Indiana University School
of Law, Bloomington, for their aid in the preparation of this article.
" Staff Attorney, Lawyers Military Defense Committee, Washington, D. C.
1. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) ; Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 145
(1968) ; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). But see McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
2. The right does not inhere solely in the defendant:
People excluded from injuries because of their race are as much aggrieved as
those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.
Carter v. Jury Comm'r, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
3. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1970).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
7. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). In this case, however, the Court
held that twelve-member juries are not constitutionally required in state courts.
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verified by the fact that juries have at times refused to convict defendants
charged with crimes stemming from unpopular political beliefs which the
Government has found offensive.8
Millions of Americans, however, do not enjoy the rights or respon-
sibilities of jury service. Members of the armed forces have only a
token representative jury system because Congress and the courts have
accepted the arguments that military courts are exempt from the con-
stitutional requirements of trial by jury and that representation on
military courts of lower ranking enlisted men would seriously under-
mine military discipline. As a result military courts are almost invariably
composed of officers, usually those senior in rank.9
In the light of recent reaffirmation of the fundamental importance
of trial by jury" and the recent expansion of the constitutional rights
of servicemen in other areas," it is important to examine once again the
method by which military courts are selected and the assumption which
have led the nation to deny so many American citizens trial by an im-
partial jury of their peers.
CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE SELECTION OF MILITARY COURT-
MARTIAL MEMBERS
Selection of triers of fact in both general and special courts-
martial is governed by article 25 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.'" Article 25 specifies those who are eligible to serve on a court-
8. J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (S.
Katz ed. 1963) ; Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71
(1969); cf. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 286-97 (1966).
9. See text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
10. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
11. Cases cited note 93 infra.
12. The procedures for convening courts-martial are outlined in DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL], which
implements the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970) [here-
inafter referred to as UCMJ]. These procedures highlight the central role that the
convening authority has in court-martial proceedings. A general or special court-martial
is created by a commanding officer or other competent superior authority. The conven-
ing authority in a general court-martial appoints an officer to investigate and to recom-
mend the proper action to be taken and the charges to be brought, but his recommenda-
tions are not binding. Then, with the aid of his staff judge advocate, the convening
authority prefers charges, appoints counsel for the government and for the accused and
selects the members of the court. He is free to replace court members at any time prior
to arraignment of the accused. UCMJ, arts. 22-32; 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-32 (1970).
The convening authority has complete discretion to convene either a special or a
general court-martial for the same offense. Since a special court-martial may not
adjudge a sentence greater than six months [UCMJ, art. 19; 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970)],
the convening authority is, thus, able to set the maximum sentence. He may also reduce
or suspend sentences or overrule findings of guilty. UCMJ, art. 64; 10 U.S.C. § 864
(1970). The power of the convening authority to reduce sentences does not necessarily
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martial and grants to the convening authority a wide range of discretion
to select court members from those eligible persons who, "in his opinion,
are best qualified . . .by reason of age, education, training, experience,
length of service, and judicial temperment."'  When, as in most courts-
martial, the accused is an enlisted man, he can request that enlisted men
serve. In that event, no fewer than one-third of the court must be com-
posed of enlisted men, and none may be lower in rank than the accused.1'
The remaining members will come from the officer ranks. In practice,
members of courts-martial are almost invariably officers," and usually
at least half are field grade officers, despite the larger number of company
grade officers who are available." When enlisted men are requested
by the accused, senior non-commissioned officers are usually appointed."'
Statistics on the rank of enlisted personnel who have served as
court members are fragmentary, but a study made by military defense
counsel in United States v. Crawford," a 1965 Court of Military Appeals
case, is most revealing. The study showed that from 1959 through 1963
no enlisted man lower than grade E-411 served on an army court-
martial.20 During the period from 1959 to 1962, 89.4 per cent of all
work in favor of the accused, since courts may impose longer sentences on the assump-
tion that the commander can reduce them if he wishes. See Hearings on S. 857 and
H.R. 4080 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., at 87 (1949). For a comprehensive and definitive review of the evolution of
the UCMJ, see Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv. 3 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Civilianization]. Particular references to evolving selection pro-
cedures are discussed by Professor Sherman at pages 13, 21-23, 43-44, 97-99. See also
Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VANo. L. REv. 169
(1952); Schiesser, Trial by Peers: Enlisted Members on Courts-Martial, 15 CATE. U.L.
REv. 171, 171-79 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Schiesser].
13. UCMJ, art. 25(d) (2), 10 U.S.C. § 825(d) (2) (1970) (emphasis added).
14. UCMJ, art. 25(c) (1), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1) (1970).
15. See text accompanying note 26 infra.
16. Field grade officers in the army are those in the ranks of major, lieutenant
colonel and colonel. Company grade officers are those in the four warrant officer
ranks, second and first lieutenants and captains. In 1970 there were 389,344 commissioned
and warrant officers for all branches of the armed forces. Of these, 264,002 were com-
pany grade officers. Statistical Tables of the Office of Defense.
17. See text accompanying notes 19-23 infra.
18. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964). Appellate defense counsel were Capt.
Charles W. Schiesser and Capt. Daniel H. Benson. See Schiesser, supra note 12, at 183-
84. Compiling such statistics requires going through all court-martial records. On the
difficulty of gaining access to such materials, see Keeffe, JAG Justice in Korea, 6 CAT.
U.L. REv. 1, 43-47 (1956).
19. Army enlisted grades run from E-1 to E-9. Generally, persons in grades E-1
to E-5 would be considered lower ranking enlisted men, although a sergeant E-5 is also
considered a noncommissioned officer. Persons in grades E-5 through E-9 are con-
sidered noncommissioned officers when placed in leadership positions. Those in grades
E-7 through E-9 are considered senior noncommissioned officers, even though an E-7
might be a specialist 7 and not be in a command position.
20. 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 36, 35 C.M.R. at 8.
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enlisted court members were in the three highest non-commissioned
officer grades (E-7 through E-9), while at the same time fewer than
six per cent of the men tried were in these same three grades.2 Estimates
by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy show that in
recent years fewer than one per cent of the cases tried had enlisted
members on the juries and that "the majority of such enlisted members
are in pay grade E-7 or above."2 Similarily, the Office of the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force has indicated that, "few if any en-
listed men below the grade of E-5 have served" on courts-martial re-
viewed by that office.2
Enlisted men generally feel that senior N.'C.O.'s are more likely to
view the actions of the accused in relation to the objectives of the military
in enforcing discipline and insuring compliance with the chain of
authority. 4 The fears of enlisted men and the expectations that only
senior N.C.O.'s will be appointed have resulted in the infrequent exercise
of the option of trial by a jury including enlisted men. In 5,582 trials,2"
occurring from 1959 to 1963, enlisted men sought appointment of enlisted
court members on only 154 occasions or in fewer than three per cent of
the total.2" A similar reluctance to request enlisted men is evident today.
21. Id. at 51, 35 C.M.R. at 23. Judge Ferguson, dissenting, supplied the figure of
89.4 per cent. Since art. 25(d) (1) provides that no person junior to the accused may
judge him, senior men would have been required in six per cent of the cases. That
figure was computed from Judge Ferguson's statement that of 154 enlisted men seeking
appointment of enlisted men only nine were in the senior three grades. Id., 35 C.M.R.
at 23.
22. Letter from Capt. K. A. Konopisos to author, May 10, 1971.
23. Letter from Col. John C. Watson (signed by Lt. Col. Paul W. Buchler) to
author, May 21, 1971.
24. See Schiesser, supra note 12, at 195-97. Although Lt. Col. Schiesser warns
against requesting enlisted men in "military-type" offenses (e.g., unauthorized absence,
breach of discipline), he says the senior enlisted member is more "likely to adopt a
tolerant attitude toward human shortcomings," such as financial or sexual problems.
Id. at 196. Many military men disagree with the latter part of that statement. See
Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Armed Services Comm., 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 724, 1140 (1949).
25. 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 51, 35 C.M.R. at 23. The opinion does not state whether the
5,582 trials included officers as accused, but the number of officers included would be
minimal. In 1967, for 1,514 approved convictions, twelve accused were officers. Letter
from Stanley II. Rubinowitz, Chief of the Examination and New Trials Division, Army
Judiciary, to Michael J. Haroz, Aug. 26, 1968, on file with the author. The figure 5,582
for four years must refer to general courts-martial.
26. Col. John Jay Douglass, Commandant of the United States Army Judge Advo-
cate General's School, reports that "trial by military judge alone has taken place in the
overwhelming majority of cases." Douglass, The Tudicialization of Military Courts, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 213, 222 (1971). Citing statistics from the Army Judiciary, a subdivi-
sion of the Department of the Army, he reports that in the six-month period from Octo-
ber 31, 1969, to March 31, 1970, of the 1,248 general courts-martial, 1,078 were tried
before a military judge alone. In the same period, 16,540 of the 17,240 accused who had
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The Army Judiciary reports that enlisted men were requested in 2.6 per
cent of the 2,441 general courts-martial held during 1968.27 In 1969,
enlisted men were requested by those accused in little more than two per.
cent of the 2,625 general courts-martial. In 1970, only eighteen service-
men tried in army general courts-martial elected trial with enlisted men
on their courts. They represent less than one per cent of the 2,740
persons tried.2" Statistics from other branches of the armed forces
show a similar reluctance of servicemen to request enlisted court mem-
bers.29
The rare occurrence of courts with lower ranking enlisted men may
result in part from the small number of trials in which enlisted men are
requested. But if these servicemen are justified in expecting that the
selection process will only produce courts with senior commissioned and
non-commissioned officers, then the selection process itself is the cause
of the general failure to exercise the option. Little attention, however,
has heretofore been given to the actual process by which courts-martial
members are selected.
the option chose trial before special courts-martial with a judge alone. In 700 cases no
military judge was detailed. Id.
Figures published in a publication of the Defense Appellate Division, Army Judi-
ciary, are startling. In the month of December, 1970, 88 per cent of army general courts-
martial reviewed were tried before a military judge alone. In November of the same
year, the figure was 86 per cent; in October, it was 87 per cent. In December, 1970,
100 per cent of special courts-martial adjudging a bad conduct discharge were tried be-
fore a military judge. In November, this figure was 99 per cent. ADVOCATE, Mar.,
1971, at 61. The figures suggest that most accused and their counsel feel a judge will
be more likely to acquit or give lighter sentences than a full court. Preliminary data for
1971 would indicate that military judges have a higher conviction rate and adjudge con-
finement in a greater percentage of the cases than do military juries. ADVOCATE, June-
July, 1971, at 114-15. This might result in part from the propensity of military defense
counsel who think their clients will be found guilty to go before a judge alone, expecting
lower sentences. "In any case the figures reflect a strong lack of confidence in the mili-
tary jury, a lack of confidence based on the composition of the juries.
27. Letter from Stanley Rubinowitz, Chief of the Examination and New Trials Di-
vision, Army Judiciary, to author, May 6, 1969.
28. Letter from Col. John T. Jones, Director of the Administrative Office, Army
Judiciary to author Apr. 19, 1971. "The lesser figure for 1970 was probably due to the
high percentage of trials by military judge alone." Id. These statistics and others for
periods after August, 1968, are not accurate reflections of the percentage of cases in
which an accused chose trial by a court, but declined enlisted men, since a growing ma-
jority of accused have taken the option of trial by military judge alone which was added
to art. 26 by the Military Justice Act of 1968. UCMJ, art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c)
(1970).
29. Air Force figures showing the number of requests for airmen in cases reviewed
by the Office of the Judge Advocate General indicate that for general courts-martial the
percentage of requests was 3.3 per cent in 1967; one per cent in the first half of 1968;
2.3 per cent in 1969; and just under four per cent in 1970. For special courts-martial
in which a bad conduct discharge was adjudged, the figures are 1.2 per cent for 1967;
3.3 per cent for the first half of 1968; and fewer than one per cent in 1969 and 1970.
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The case of United States v. Flint,3" a general court-martial con-
vened by Headquarters, XXIV Corps Danang, provides a typical
example3 of the normal procedure for selection of court members. 2 In
Flint, the task of providing a list of prospective candidates was delegated
to the staff judge advocate. He in turn requested a list from the per-
sonnel officer, of XXIV Corps, who requested subordinate units to
forward the names of 85 officers for possible duty; 39 of these officers
were to be field grade, and 46 were to be company grade."3 The per-
sonnel officers of the various subordinate units then made the selections.
Subordinate units often used the duty roster, a rotating list of officers
available for special assignment, to make their selections. Other per-
sonnel officers selected men they knew or who had free time. The final
list of 85 names wes given to the staff judge advocate. Neither the staff
judge advocate nor the personnel officer of XXIV Corps could testify
as to how the figure of 85 was reached or how the breakdown of field
and company grade officers was reached. Each testified that when he
assumed duty the breakdown was standing policy in his office.'
The deputy staff judge advocate narrowed this list to 25. He
deleted names of persons who had previously served on the court, who
were in the medical corps and, in this case, those who were in the military
The 1967 and 1968 figures were obtained by inspection of records at the Office of the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, Court-Martial Records. The 1969 and 1970
figures were obtained from the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
by letter from Col. John C. Watson (signed by Lt. Col. Paul W. Buchler) to author,
May 21, 1971.
The Navy estimates that fewer than one per cent of enlisted men requested enlisted
court members in 1969 and 1970. Letter from Capt. K. A. Konopisos to author, May
10, 1971.
30. U.S. Army Court-Martial Convening Order No. 45 (1971).
31. Over the past year the author has been one of four staff attorneys for the
Lawyer's Military Defense Committee, Langdell Hall, Cambridge, Massachusetts, with
offices in Saigon, South Vietnam. During this time the author has served as defense
counsel before Army, Navy and Marine courts-martial in which the method by which
court members were selected was challenged. In each case the method of selection has
been made a matter of record. The information gained at these pre-trial hearings has
been supplemented by discussion with convening authorities, staff judge advocates, trial
and defense counsel and line officers. In no case was the strict language of article
25(d) (2) complied with in court selection.
32. The selection process was made a matter of record during pretrial hearings
held on May 5, 10 and 11, 1971.
33. The request was for three colonels, thirteen lieutenant colonels, 23 majors, 22
captains, 22 first lieutenants, one second lieutenant and one warrant officer third class.
Record, at 72; Appellate Exhibit X.
34. A staff memorandum from one general court-martial jurisdiction suggests that
two colonels, three lieutenant colonels, two majors, two captains and one lieutenant
would provide a "balanced representation" of ranks. For special courts-martial, the
memorandum suggests one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, two majors, one captain and
one lieutenant. HQ I Field Force Vietnam, Staff Memorandum 27-1, Feb. 21, 1971.
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police corps. Also excluded were persons who had fewer than ninety
days to serve in Vietnam. In addition, ten were removed "at random"
before the final list was submitted to the general. The reason given for
reducing the list to 25 names was that the convening authority could not
be expected to make an intelligent choice from so large a list.
The accused's request for enlisted members went to a subordinate
command judge advocate who asked his personnel officer for enlisted
nominations from grades E-5 through E-8 who met the criteria of
article 25(d) (2). This request was referred to a warrant officer,"s a
sergeant first class (E-7) and finally to various non-commissioned
officers in subordinate units who chose men in the various grades and
forwarded their names. The list of 24 officers given to the convening
authority, from which he was to select ten individuals, consisted of one
colonel, seven lieutenant colonels, nine majors, five captains, three first
lieutenants, and no second lieutenants or warrant officers. He was directed
to choose four enlisted men from the list of twelve nominees, consisting
of three men each from grades E-5 through E-8. The convening authority
selected one enlisted man from each grade and then excused the E-5 prior
to trial because of his workload.
The Flint case is typical. The actual selection process not only re-
sulted in a systematic exclusion of lower ranked enlisted men, but also
was made with scant reference to article 25 (d) (2) criteria. The deputy
staff advocate's request to the personnel office for nominees made no
reference to article 25(d) (2) criteria. Although article 25(d) (2) was
mentioned in the directive for selecting men, it is unclear whether the
criteria were applied or even understood.e The warrant officer and
sergeant first class who were instructed to make the choices knew
neither the subordinate enlisted men who chose the enlisted nominees
nor the qualifications of the men chosen. Although the convening
authority is required to select members who are in his opinion best
qualified, the effective choice of court members was exercised by the
staff judge advocate, personnel officers, warrant officers and even en-
listed men from the N.C.O. ranks. Of the approximately 20,000 men
35. The same warrant officer had testified in a previous case, United States v.
Woodmancy, U.S. Army Court-Martial Convening Order No. - (1971) [on file at
HQ XXIV Corps, Danang, Vietnam], that he personally felt no E-4 or below had
enough "sense" to serve as a court member and that he himself had selected only per-
sonnel with "career potential."
36. The warrant officer testified that the sergeant read the command judge advo-
cate's request, which contained reference to the article 25(d)(2) requirements of "age,
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament," to each
subordinate non-commissioned officer he called. Record, at 96.
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under the convening authority's court-martial jurisdiction, all but 36
had been excluded before the convening authority made his selection. 7
Senior officers had been favored and the lower ranked enlisted men
were almost entirely excluded before the convening authority made his
choice. Even during the final selection process the convening authority
had no opportunity to apply article 25 (d) (2) criteria because no service
records or personal information about the nominees were furnished. The
lists given to the convening authority contained only name, rank, unit,
and date of rotation to next assignment. This is hardly sufficient infor-
mation on which to form an intelligent opinion as to the relative com-
petence of the nominees.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MILITARY JURY
Article 25(d) (2), both on its face and as applied by local com-
mands, is in apparent conflict with several provisions of the United
States Constitution. Article III, § 2, provides in part: "The Trial of
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury." The
sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."
The fifth amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." As previously
mentioned, this clause of the fifth amendment has been interpreted to
require that the jury selection process shall not systematically exclude any
identifiable class or group. 8 The Supreme Court, however, has con-
sistently assumed, with little discussion, that the right to trial by jury
does not apply to courts-martial. In fact the Court has never considered
the applicability of the due process clause to military court selection.
The Court subscribed very early to the proposition that military
courts are not subject to article III requirements. In Dynes v. Hoover,89
decided in 1857, a seaman brought an action claiming that the offense of
which he had been convicted was not within the jurisdiction of the
37. In some jurisdictions the convening authority is merely given a list of names
which he routinely approves. In United States v. Wells, U.S. Air Force Court-Martial
Convening Order No. - (1971), linder consideration sub non. United States v. Craw-
ford (Air Force Ct. of Military Review, No. 20964), the general court-martial conven-
ing authority sent a message to the staff judge advocate of the special court-martial
convening authority requesting that a panel of ten officers (in specified ranks) be nomi-
nated. The staff judge advocate selected twenty names from the officer roster of the
special court-martial jurisdiction. He presented the list (along with an officer roster)
to the special court-martial convening authority, who "nominated" ten names from the
list of twenty. These nominations were subsequently approved by the general court-
martial authority upon his staff judge advocate's recommendation.
38. See notes 1 & 2 supra & text accompanying.
39. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
200
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military court. The Court, in dismissing the action, held that because
the naval court-martial was properly brought under Navy regulations, no
jurisdictional defect was present. Although the jury issue was not raised,
Dynes held that military courts are basically administrative tribunals
independent of article III courts.
The rationale of the Supreme Court was that military courts were
treated as a separate entity from the civilian judicial power under the
Constitution. To support this reasoning the Court noted that in article
I, § 8, Congress was granted the power to "provide and maintain a navy,"
and "to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces, and
that article II, § 2, gave to the President the office of commander-in-
chief of the armed forces. Because of this separate treatment, the Court
concluded that "the power to provide for the trial and punishment of
military and naval offenses . . . is given without any connection between
it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of
the United States."4
The Supreme Court also noted that the fifth amendment specifically
excepts "cases arising in the land or naval forces" from the grand jury
requirement.,1 However, it ignored the sixth amendment mandate that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." which does not ex-
clude cases arising in the land and naval forces. Nor did the Court offer
any historical basis for its conclusion that article I, § 8, exempts the
armed services from the requirements of article III.
In Ex parte Milligan42 the Supreme Court confronted the sixth
amendment right to jury trial by way of dictum. The majority quoted
the sixth amendment and the exception for members of the armed forces in
the fifth amendment. But without further discussion, the Court concluded
that the sixth amendment right only applied "to those persons who were
subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth." 3  The concurring
opinion by Chief Justice Chase reached the same conclusion using both
legislative history and the framers' intent. He noted that prior to the
40. Id. at 79.
41. Id. at 78. The Court referred to the "8th Amendment" but meant the 5th
Amendment provision that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, except on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger. . . ." Although an argument might be made that "in
time of war" refers to all armed services, the logical construction seems to be that
taken by the Court-that the phrase applies only to the militia. See Johnson v. Sayre,
158 U.S. 109, 113-15 (1895).
42. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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adoption of the Bill of Rights, three states proposed drafts of the sixth
amendment which excluded the armed forces from jury trial guarantees. 3
Hence, he concluded that the excepting provision, although embodied
only in the fifth amendment, was intended to have general application.
Therefore, the sixth amendment, which did not include the proposed
exclusion, must be read as if it did.4
The first direct challenge to denial of the right to jury trial in the
military was heard by the Supreme Court in Kahn v. Anderson.5
Once again the Court assumed, without analysis, that no such right
existed. Although the Court referred to "numerous decisions"4" support-
ing this proposition, it cited only Ex parte Reed," decided in 1879,
where the jury issue was not raised.4" From this questionable authority,
the Court concluded that the constitutionality of acts of Congress touch-
ing on the military is no longer open to question.
The jury issue was discussed at some length in Ex parte Quirin,49
a World War II case involving civilian spy activities in the United
States. The defendants, tried by a special military commission,5" asserted
their right to trial by jury as a ground for habeas corpus. Chief justice
43. Id. at 123.
44. Id. at 138. The reasoning of Chief Justice Chase has been expanded in a law
review article, Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 293 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Henderson]. Mr. Hender-
son concluded that the "original understanding" of the framers of the Constitution was
that the Bill of Rights did apply to the military, but that both the article III and the
sixth amendment jury provisions were specifically excluded. There is, however, nothing
in the history he presents to warrant a distinction between the sixth amendment jury
guarantee and the rest of the Bill of Rights, nor is there any evidence that article III
was not to apply to the military. See also Wiener, Courts-Martial md the Bill of Rights:
The Original Practice II, 72 HARv. L. REv. 266 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Wiener].
Article III, § 2 provides, in part: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by jury." There is no exception for the military. Mr. Henderson
correctly points out that the failure to except the military cannot be explained on the
grounds that the clause was intended to apply only to article III courts, because cases
of impeachment, for which the Senate is the exclusive tribunal, are specifically excepted.
His conclusion, however, is that the failure specifically to exclude military crimes was
the result of "oversight." Similar reasoning and conclusions are used to reconcile a
construction excluding the application of the sixth amendment jury provision to the
military.
The oversight arguments of Mr. Henderson and of Chief Justice Chase in Milligan
are questioned in notes 73-80 infra and text accompanying.
45. 255 U.S. 1 (1920).
46. Id. at 8.
47. 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
48. Reed cited only Dynes and the Constitution to support denial of the right to
jury trial in the military.
49. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
50. The commission was appointed solely to try the petitioners under procedures
prescribed by the President. Order of July 2, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (1942).
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Stone stated that the object of article III, § 2, was to preserve the right
to jury trial as it then existed and not to expand this right to cases where
a jury trial was not guaranteed under the common law. He cited two
cases for his conclusion that military courts were not courts in the sense
of the judiciary article,5 but those cases ruled on the applicability of the
Judiciary Act of 1789,52 not article III. The Chief justice, citing only
Milligan, further noted that the fifth and sixth amendments did not en-
large the scope of article III, § 2, since the fifth amendment exception
applied by implication to the sixth amendment,. He also referred to a
"long-continued and consistent interpretation"5 of all three provisions.
In the case of Whelchel v. McDonald,4 the jury issue was raised in a
different form. Whelchel claimed that enlisted members should sit on his
court-martial board55 and that an all-officer court violated due process re-
quirements. Rather than discuss the applicability of the due process clause
to the selection of military courts, the Court summarily dismissed the con-
tention, saying that the make up of the court-martial was "a matter
appropriate for congressional action."5 "
Most recently, in O'Callahan v. Parker,"r the Supreme Court again
simply assumed that the right to trial by jury for all crimes does not apply
to the military;
The Constitution gives Congress power to "make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"
Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, and it recognizes that the exigencies of
military discipline require the existence of a special system of
military courts in which not all of the specific procedural
protections deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply. The
Fifth Amendment specifically exempts "cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger" from the requirement of prosecution
51. In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900) ; Ex parte Vallandighar, 68 U.S. (2 Wall.)
243 (1863).
52. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
53. 317 U.S. at 40.
54. 340 U.S. 122 (1950).
55. At the time of Whelchel's trial the law provided only for officer courts. 10
U.S.C. § 1475 (1946). By 1950, the UCMJ had been passed, permitting enlisted men
to serve. 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1970).
56. 340 U.S. at 127. For this point Justice Douglas cited Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 553 (1897), in which the President had been allowed to send the case back to
the commission twice for a higher sentence, and two cases, Mullan v. United States, 140
U.S. 240 (1891), and Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), upholding the
discretion of the commander to choose the number and rank of court members.
57. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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by indictment and inferentially, from the right to trial by jury.5"
However, the Court went on to its landmark holding that unless a
crime is clearly "service connected," the accused must be tried by civilian
courts where he would be afforded constitutional guarantees such as the
right to trial by jury."
The conclusion that article III, § 2, and the sixth amendment, as
well as the due process clause of the fifth amendment, do not apply to
military courts has gone relatively unchallenged for over a hundred
years despite questionable precedential support. Examined closely, the
arguments used in support of this doctrine are not persuasive. One
such argument, given by Chief Justice Stone in Quirin, is that the
right to trial by jury was intended to be limited to the rights granted at
common law.6" Since jury trial was not a right of the military under the
common law, the Constitution does not now guarantee trial by jury to
the military.61 The notion that the right to jury trial is frozen in those
situations in which there was a right to a jury at common law is no
longer acceptable,62 and had, in fact, been rejected in Glasser v. United
States,"3 which was decided before Quirin. The Court stated in Glasser:
[Elven as jury trial, which was a privilege at common law,
has become a right with us, so also, whatever limitations were
inherent in the historical common law concept of the jury as a
body of one's peers do not prevail in this country. Our notions
of what proper a jury is have developed in harmony with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative govern-
ment.64
Chief Justice Stone's view that trial by jury was historically un-
available to the military" rests in part upon a misconception as to the
58. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
59. For the significance of the service connection holding in O'Calladan see notes
128-31 infra & text accompanying.
60. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Gutaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 971 (1926), arguing that the sixth
amendment has no force independent of history.
61. 317 U.S. at 40.
62. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970). See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), holding that a jury trial is
now required in certain criminal contempts.
63. 315 U.S. 60 (1941).
64. Id. at 85. See also Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 588 (1958): "But
local tradition cannot justify failure to comply with the constitutional mandate requiring
equal protection of the laws."
65. The view has been shared by courts and writers. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S.
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status of court-martial jurisdiction when the Constitution was ratified.
At the time of ratification the military did not have authority to try
members of the armed forces for civilian crimes. Therefore, servicemen
were tried by civilian juries for civilian crimes, and, therefore, trial by
jury was available in most cases to members of the armed forces.
Congress first authorized military trial of soldiers for "civilian" crimes
in 1863, and even then such trials were permitted only in wartime.6 In
peacetime soldiers were still tried by civilian courts for civilian crimes."7
Thus, even if one were to accept the theory of the Supreme Court in
Quirin that right to trial by jury was "frozen at common law," the right
to trial by jury could only be denied persons accused of "military"
crimes,68 since at common law non-military offenses were usually tried
by civilian jury.69
It has also been argued that the relatively small number of men in
the armed services when the 'Constitution was ratified indicates that
the framers had little reason to be concerned with due process in the
military." Therefore, the argument goes, the military was excluded from
the Bill of Rights, and there is no right to trial by jury today. The
disparity between the numbers of servicemen then and now, however,
might well lead one to the opposite conclusion. If, in fact, the framers
1, 8-9 (1920) ; Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) ; Henderson, supra note 44; Wiener,
supra note 44.
66. Act of Mar. 3. 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736. The civilian-type crimes
which were added by this Act were the common law crimes of larceny, murder, assault,
battery and rape. The "wartime" restriction was not removed until 1916. Act of Aug.
29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666. For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween the military and civilian courts at common law, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
23-30 (1957), O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. at 268-70 (1969). See also F. WIENER,
CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE (1967).
67. 2 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES 91 (1st ed. 1849). See Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. at 24 n.44. The experience of the common law was a constant battle
to preserve itself from encroachment by the military. See 1 C. CLODE, MILITARY FORCES
OF THE CROWN, 19-21, 55-61, 76-78, 142-66, 499-501, 519-20 (1869).
68. "Military" offenses include absence without leave, desertion and refusal to
obey an order. Theft, even of military materials, is a civilian crime. In fiscal 1967, four
times as many trials for non-military offenses as for military offenses occurred in the
Air Force. USAF, ANNUAL REPORT OF COURT-MARTIAL AcTIVITIES FROM THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL (1968). In the other services, military offenses usually outnumber
civilian offenses. During 1968, of 2,441 Army general courts-martial, 2,113 civilian and
2,471 military offenses were tried. Letter from Stanley Rubinowitz, Chief of the Ex-
amination and New Trials Division, Army Judiciary, to author, May 6, 1969. In the
years 1969 and 1970 the Navy judge Advocate General reviewed a total of 12,128 of-
fenses. Of these, 2,936 were civilian and 9,192 were military. Several offenses might
be tried before one court. Letter from Capt. K. A. Konopisos to author, May 10, 1971.
69. Until passage of the UCMJ in 1950, an Army court-martial had no jurisdiction
over a murder or rape within the continental United States in peacetime. Compare 62
Stat. 604, 640 (1948) with UCMJ, art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1970).
70. Wiener, supra note 44, at 8-13.
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were willing to forego a substantial right for a few thousand"' servicemen
tried for "military" offenses (and it is far from clear the framers meant
to do so), they still may not have been willing to have the same result
apply when, as today, there are over three million men in the armed
services."2
Another questionable argument is that the intent of the framers of
the Constitution was to exclude the military from the right to a jury trial.
Therefore, the argument goes, article III, § 2, must be read as if it did
not include the military, while the exclusionary clause of the fifth amend-
ment applies by implication to the sixth amendment.73 This contention
is based on the fact that the proposals of Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and New York concerning the Bill of Rights excluded the military from
the jury trial guarantees7 and that Madison's proposal would have done
the same."5 However, this argument runs counter to normal rules of
statutory construction. Since article III, § 2, specifically excepts cases of
impeachment from the jury trial guarantee, yet does not except the
military, the normal conclusion would be that the drafters intended that
all those cases which were to be excepted were specifically described and
that all other cases would be included. As for the Bill of Rights, the fact
that the framers made a specific exception in the fifth amendment, yet
did not in the sixth, would indicate that the military was not to be
excepted from the operation of the sixth amendment."
The framers of the Constitution were aware of the possibility of
including specific exceptions of the military from article III and the
sixth amendment, for their proposals included such exceptions, and such
an exception was written into the fifth amendment. The fact that the
final language adopted in these provisions did not include such except-
ions indicates an intentional effort to include the military.7 It is normally
71. Id. at 9, citing E. UPTON, THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 83
(1912).
72. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, table 393, at 260 (91st ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT].
73. See note 44 supra.
74. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (1780); N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, arts. XV, XVI
(1783) ; 1 J. ELLIOTT, ELLIOT'S DEBATES 328 (2d ed. 1836) (New York proposal) [here-
inafter cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. The Maryland proposal excluded the military from
other guarantees as well. 2 id. at 550. Other proposals failed to make any exception for
the military.
75. See Henderson, supra note 44, at 310.
76. See generally 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§
4502, 4505-06, 4915-17 (3d ed. 1943).
77. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 n.20 (1968), the Supreme Court
assumed that a similar failure to adopt a specific right to jury trial in state criminal
cases indicated that the sixth amendment was not intended to bind the states. Similarly,
servicemen ought not to be bound by a proposed and rejected exclusion.
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a questionable practice to read exceptions into constitutional or statutory
language." But it is particularly questionable to go beyond the clear
language of the Constitution when, as here, the history is ambiguous
and the effect is to bar more than three million United States citizens
from the fundamental, twice-guaranteed," right to trial by jury in all
criminal cases. The reasoning of the cases hardly seems sufficient to
justify denying constitutional rights which the Court recently declared
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice."8
ARTICLE III, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND
FIFTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION
The ease with which the Supreme Court has dealt with the article
III and sixth amendment rights to trial by jury in the military is at
variance with its serious examination of the elements of the right to jury
trial in civilian areas. In Duncan the Court overturned a century of
precedent to hold that the sixth amendment right to trial by jury is
applicable to the states through incorporation into the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Bloom v. Illinois,8 the right to a jury in serious contempt
cases was reaffirmed, giving rise to an inference that any sentence of
confinement for more than six months would require a jury verdict. In
Baldwin v. New York,82 a New York City ordinance denying jury
trials in misdemeanors was invalidated. The Court stated:
[N]o offense can be deemed "petty" for purposes of the right
to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months
is authorized.82
In the military sphere, however, deference to the vague and ill-
defined notion of "military necessity" has led the Court to maintain a
hands-off attitude toward jury trial. The Court's stated unwillingness to
interfere with the powers granted Congress under article I, § 8, has
resulted in what may well be a failure to perform its own judicial duties
under article III. If the two constitutional mandates were in direct
conflict and the extension of the right to trial by jury to servicemen
78. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840). See also Williams
v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572-73 (1933) ; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151
(1926); United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3, 25 (1964) (dis-
senting opinion).
79. For a discussion of the interaction between article III, § 2, and the sixth
amendment, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-96 (1970).
80. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
81. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
82. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
83. Id. at 69.
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would actually result in drastic interference with the national defense
mission of the armed forces, then arguably the jury right should give
way. Mere inconvenience or additional expense, on the other hand,
would not seem to justify denial of rights twice-guaranteed all citizens.
The court has never attempted to determine what effect trial by jury
would have on the military mission or the extent to which the current
system could be modified to meet constitutional standards without inter-
fering unduly with that mission.
The right of a civilian to an impartial jury is a settled question. In
a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that intentional exclusion
of blacks from state and federal juries is violative of the due process
and equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.84 There
was no statutory bar in these cases to the presence of blacks on juries,
but the method of selection by local officials had operated to exclude or
to limit severely participation by blacks. Nor is the requirement of an
impartial fact finder limited to a prohibition on racial discrimination."
In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,8" the Supreme Court exercised its
supervisory powers" to prohibit discrimination against wage earners,
holding that:
Wage earners, including those who are paid by the day,
constitute a very substantial portion of the community, a portion
that cannot be intentionally and systematically excluded in
whole or in part without doing violence to the democratic nature
of the jury system. Were we to sanction an exclusion of this
84. See Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) ; Eubanks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 584 (1958) ; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) ; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282 (1950) ; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613
(1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1881) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
For further discussion of civilian juries, see Kubin, Jury Discrimination: The Next
Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1968) ; Note, The Congress, The Court and Jury Selec-
tion: A Critiqve of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. Rxv. 1069
(1966).
85. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge had financial interest in
outcome) ; Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1963) (jury witnessed announce-
ment of defendant's guilt in another case) ; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (prejudi-
cial publicity) ; Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
991 (1967) (exclusion of wage earners). United States v. Hedges, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 642,
29 C.M.R. 458 (1960) (preponderance of law enforcement officers on court). See also
Hart, The Case for Federal Jury Reform, 53 A.B.A.J. 129 (1967).
86. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
87. Although Thiel was a civil case, the Supreme Court has also exercised its
powers of supervision over the lower federal courts in criminal cases. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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nature . . . [w] e would breathe life into any latent tendencies
to establish the jury as the instrument of the economically and
socially privileged. That we refuse to do.8
In Labat v. Bennett,8" the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
principle enunciated in Theil is constitutionally required.9
In 1968, Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act,91
which provides that all jurors in the federal district courts be selected
at random without regard to "race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
or economic status."92 In doing so, Congress codified case law setting
out constitutional requirements in the area of jury selection.
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
IN THE MILITARY COURTS
The due process and incorporated equal protection clause of the fifth
amendment have been applied by the Court of Military Appeals so as
to extend to servicemen many of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 3
The court has held that only the dictates of "military necessity" will limit
the application of the first ten amendments to the military. 4 In United
88. Id., at 223-24. In Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), the Court held
that systematic exclusion of women violated the statutory requirement of a cross-section
of the community.
89. 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 991 (1967).
90. The Court of Appeals of Georgia similarly interpreted Thiel in terms of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment, holding that due process
requires selection from a full cross section of the community. Allen v. State, 110 Ga.
App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964). See also State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880
(1965) ; Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1970).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970).
93. The due process rights which have been extended include the right to a public
trial, United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956) ; the right against
self-incrimination, United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962);
the right to confront witnesses, United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R.
244 (1960) ; right to counsel, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411
(1963); right against unreasonable searches and seizures, United States v. Vierra, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260 (1963); right of compulsory process, United States v.
Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964); right to a speedy trial, United
States v. Schalck, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34 C.M.R. 151 (1964) ; right to Miranda warnings,
United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967) ; and (theoretically)
jury selection not arbitrarily and deliberately discriminatory, United States v. Crawford,
15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.MR 41 (1956)
(public trial) ; United States v. Soto, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 583, 37 C.M.R. 203 (1967) (search
and seizure). For a review of military due process, see Quinn, Some Comparisonms Be-
tween Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 1240 (1968); Quinn,
The United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual Rights in the Military
Service, 35 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 491 (1960) ; Quinn, The United States Court of Military
Appeals and Military Dne Process, 35 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 225 (1960). See also Warren,
INDIANA LA W JO URNAL
States v. Jacoby,95 a 1960 case holding the sixth amendment right to
confrontation of witnesses applicable to the military, the Court of Military
Appeals stated:
[I]t is apparent that the protections in the Bill of Rights,
except those which are expressly or by necessary implication
inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces."
In United States v. TempiaP7 the court firmly established the direct
applicability of the Bill of Rights to servicemen:
The time is long since past . . . when this court will lend an
attentive ear to the argument that members of the armed services
are, by reason of their status, ipso facto deprived of all pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights."8
In the area of jury guarantees the due process clause of the fifth
amendment would seem to require that the accused serviceman be granted
an impartial court drawn from a cross-section of the population. Most
state and federal jury cases have not been decided on the basis of article
III, § 2, or the sixth amendment but on the "due process" and "equal
protection" clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 9 The teach-
ing of these cases is that once a system of trial by jury is established, due
process requires that no class or group be deliberately excluded, par-
ticularly members of an identifiable class to which the accused belongs.
To deny an accused enlisted man trial by a jury of his peers while
giving such a trial to an officer is a denial of equal protection "so
unjustifiable" as to constitute a violation of the fifth amendment due
process clause.' The lower rank enlisted person is in much the same
The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181 (1962). For a review by a
commentator unhappy about the extension of constitutional guarantees to the military,
see Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUm. L. RF.v.
127 (1964). For a comprehensive review of military procedural due process, see
Civilianization, supra note 12.
95. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
96. Id. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47.
97. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
98. Id. at 633, 37 C.M.R. at 253. See also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953);
In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965) (right to counsel where charges substan-
tial). Contra, Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
99. It was not until Duncan (1968) that the Supreme Court held the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury to be such a "fundamental" right that it was directly in-
corporated into the fourteenth amendment.
100. Fourteenth amendment equal protection standards arguably apply to purely
federal matters like those under discussion. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
the Supreme Court, in considering racial segregation in the public schools of the District
of Columbia, said:
But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
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position as those who are discriminated against on the basis of race,
economic status or any other factor which bears no substantial relation
to an ability to function as a juror.
In 1964, the Court of Military Appeals was confronted in Craw-
ford.. with the issue of due process requirements in the military jury
context. In Crawford, a private (E-2) was convicted by a court in which
the only enlisted members were three sergeants major (E-9) and one
master sergeant (E-7). The accused contended that the selection process
violated due process in that all enlisted personnel lower than E-7 were
arbitrarily and discriminatorily excluded from court membership. The
court held that the due process clause must be applied to the manner of
selection of military courts. Both the majority and the dissent agreed
that "[c]onstitutional due process includes the right to be treated
equally with all other accused in the selection of impartial triers of the
facts."'02 The court held, however, that a showing of systematic exclusion
had not been made.
One reason for the court's conclusion was the administrative dif-
ficulty of considering servicemen other than senior enlisted personnel.
The court took judical notice that many enlisted men below the senior
enlisted ranks would qualify under the article 25(d) (2) criteria, but
suggested that such individuals could not be found without a "substantial
preliminary screening"'' made necessary by the large numbers who
would not qualify. The military necessity of expending a minimum
amount of time and effort in the selection process made the systematic
exclusion of lower ranking enlisted personnel reasonable.' Thus, although
Crawford affirmed the application of the due process clause to the
military in the matter of court selection, it found administrative con-
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection
of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due
process of the law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always
interchangeable phrases. But, . . . discrimination may be so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process.
Id. at 499.
101. A study conducted by Crawford's counsel is discussed in note 18 et seq. szupra &
text accompanying.
102. Id. at 35, 35 C.M.R. at 7. Appellant also contended that a black was arbi-
trarily included, but the court found no error in this. Id. at 41, 35 C.M.R. at 13.
103. Id. at 34, 35 C.M.R. at 6.
104. Id. at 40, 35 C.M.R. at 12.
105. The court further noted:
[There is] a general understanding that the relationship between the prescribed
qualifications for court membership, especially "training, experience, and length
of service," and seniority of rank is so close that the probabilities are that those
in the more senior ranks would most often be called upon to serve.
Id. at 40, 35 C.M.R. at 12.
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venience to be a factor which could be considered in defining the degree
of due process required.
Decisions since Crawford which have broadened the scope of due
process in the military, the increase in the educational level of enlisted
personnel,' ° and the Court of Military Appeals' 1970 decision in United
States v. Greene.0 7 suggest that the court might take a closer look at the
composition of courts-martial with enlisted members if the issue were
presented today. In Greene, the court considered a challenge to a panel
which consisted of senior members. In that case, however, the court was
an all-officer panel whose members were specifically limited to lieutenant
colonel and above. In a unanimous opinion, the court held that such an
exclusion of lower grade officers was impermissible. Although the facts
showed direct interference by the office of the Staff Judge Advocate in
a previously chosen court which included lower grade officers, Greene
is hardly distinguishable from Crawford. Having admitted in Greene
that the greater age, experience, training and length of service of senior
officers are not sufficient grounds to justify exclusion of junior grade
officers, the court will be hard put not to hold the same for situations
involving enlisted men. To uphold the exclusion of lower ranked enlisted
men after Greene would be to hold, in effect, that their status as enlisted
men ipso facto makes their education and judicial temperament insufficient
for service on courts. Such a conclusion, in today's highly educated
service, would be difficult to support.
The wide discretion given the convening authority to choose court-
members from within military ranks has been upheld consistently by
the Court of Military Appeals." 8 Even if a cross-section of all ranks
were required, a convening authority or his subordinates could choose
men known to be service-oriented in outlook or those with "career
potential."1 9 Without stronger evidence of command exclusion of non-
career personnel than that of failure to appoint from their ranks, it is
doubtful that the selection process from within ranks could be success-
fully challenged. Although random selection of courts is not compelled
under current Supreme Court interpretation of the due process clause,"1
106. See note 133 infra & text accompanying.
107. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72 (1970). See also the decision of an Army
Court of Military Review in United States v. Jacobson, 39 C.M.R. 516 (1968).
108. Green v. Convening Authority, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 42 C.M.R. 178 (1970);
United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964). The court has not,
however, examined the propriety of delegating court-member selection to the convening
authority's subordinates under procedures like those followed in the Flint case, described
in notes 30-37 supra & text accompanying.
109. See note 35 supra.
110. The Supreme Court has recently upheld statutes in Georgia and Alabama
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that method would appear to be the only effective means of preventing
discrimination in the selection of members from within the ranks.
*MILITARY NECESSITY
The Court of Military Appeals has expressly held "military neces-
sity" to be a limit upon the application of the due process clause to the
military."' Similarly, the implication of the Supreme Court cases dis-
cussed earlier is that military necessity prevents the application of tradi-
tional trial-by-jury requirements to military justice. The jury guarantees
of article III and of the sixth amendment, and particularly those of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment can, however, be constitu-
tionally limited, if at all, only to the extent actually required by the
special nature of -the military mission. Therefore, to determine whether
there is a right to jury trial and whether full due process rights under
the fifth amendment should apply, it is necessary to examine the probable
effects of increased participation by enlisted men in jury trials on both
the administration of military justice and on military discipline. More-
over, such a discussion may aid in determining the wisdom and potential
scope of future congressional action in this area.
Trial by jury in the federal court system means trial by a twelve
member jury which can convict or acquit only with the unanimous agree-
ment of the twelve jurors. The military requires a minimum of only
three court members for special courts-martial and five for general
courts-martial." 2 Although a unanimous vote is required to convict a
serviceman of a crime for which death is the mandatory punishment,"'
and a three-fourths vote is required if a sentence in excess of ten years
is mandatory,"' only a two-thirds majority is required for other guilty
verdicts."' If twelve member juries and unanimous verdicts were required
granting broad discretion to jury commissioners in the selection of panels. In Carter v.
Jury Comm'r, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), the Court upheld an Alabama statute calling for
jurors "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent . . . and . . . esteemed in the
community for their integrity, good character, and sound judgment." Id. at 323. In
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), a Georgia statute requiring selection based on
intelligence was upheld on its face, even though its application was unconstitutional. In
both cases the duty to show the statute was not administered in a discriminatory manner
was placed on the state.
The similarity of the criteria upheld in Carter and those of article 25 (d) (2) sug-
gests that the Supreme Court would not find article 25(d) (2) unconstitutional on its
face.
111. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
112. UCMJ, art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970). As a practical matter, special courts
usually have at least four or five members and general courts at least seven or eight.
113. UCMJ, art. 52(a) (1), 10 U.S.C. § 852(a) (1) (1970).
114. UCMJ, art. 52(b) (2), 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (2) (1970).
115. UCMJ, art. 52(a) (2), 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (2) (1970).
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of the military there could be some impact on the military mission.
Twelve-member juries would require more members for court duty,
especially if there were to be an increase in requests for trials by full
courts. Additionally, the requirement for a unanimous verdict would
undoubtedly result in an increase in the number of hung juries, thus
necessitating the time and expense of new trials.'16
However, in a 1970 decision, Williams v. Florida,1 7 the Supreme
Court held that a twelve-member jury is not constitutionally required in
criminal cases in state courts and suggested that it may only be a matter
of time before the Court holds that unanimous verdicts are not required." 8
In upholding the Florida six-man jury statute, the Court found "absolutely
no indication in 'the intent of the Framers' of an explicit decision to
equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the jury."19
After a lengthy review of the constitutional and historical basis of the
jury guarantees, Mr. Justice White concluded:
Nothing in this history suggests, then, that we do violence to
the letter of the Constitution by turning to other than purely
historical considerations to determine which features of the
jury system, as it existed at common law, were preserved in the
Constitution. The relevent inquiry, as we see it, must be the
function that the particular feature performs and its relation
to the purposes of the jury trial."'
The Court found nothing in the traditional role of the jury which required
that it be composed of twelve members. As Justice Harlan wrote in
dissent:
The necessary consequence of this decision is that 12-member
juries are not constitutionally required in federal criminal trials
either."'
Justice Harlan also noted that the Court's analysis and conclusions in
116. It has also been argued that unanimous verdicts would result in more com-
promise verdicts, thus permitting more accused servicemen to get off with lenient sen-
tences. Haralson, Unanimo us Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 Miss. LJ. 185 (1950).
But compromise verdicts can as often work against an accused, producing a conviction
when reasonable doubt exists in the minds of at least some jurors.
117. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
118. The Court has the issue before it in Apodaca v. Oregon, 400 U.S. 901 (1970),
noting prob. juris. in State v. Apodaca, 1 Ore. App. 484, 462 P.2d 691 (1969).
119. 399 U.S. at 99.
120. Id. at 99-100.
121. Id. at 118 (emphasis in original). Although Mr. Justice Harlan's statement
is persuasive, the question will not be decided until federal courts are authorized juries
of fewer than twelve members.
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regard to the requirement of twelve-member juries are hardly distin-
guishable from those which apply to the constitutional requirement for
unanimous verdicts. There is little in the function of the unanimous
verdict which makes it any more sacrosanct than the twelve-member jury.
The due process clause, however, undoubtedly places some limitations
on the extent to which Congress and the states can move away from the
traditional concept of a twelve-member, unanimous-verdict jury. A three-
member jury which can convict by a one-third vote might appear con-
stitutionally permissible under the logic of Williams, but it would make
such a sham of trial by jury that it would probably be considered a viola-
tion of due process. Williams suggests, however, that the current military
minimum of five general court-martial jurors deciding by a two-thirds
verdict might still be constitutionally permissible if the article III and
sixth amendment jury guarantees were to be applied to the military.122
The strict application of traditional jury trial guarantees to the
military require significant changes in the current structure of trial by
special courts-martial. In Baldwin v. New York,"' decided the same day
as Wiliams, the Supreme Court held that jury trials are required only
where penalties in excess of six months are authorized. Only Justices
Black and Douglas would have required jury trials where penalties of
six months or less are authorized. If jury trial were a matter of right
to servicemen, Baldwin would require only special courts-martial adjudg-
122. But see Larkin, Should the Military Less Than Unanimous Verdict of Guilt
Be Retained?, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Larkin]. Prof. Muri
Larkin, whose article was apparently written before Williams was decided, argues that
the less-than-unanimous verdict constitutes* an erosion of the standard of reasonable
doubt sufficient to constitute a denial of due process. "[Plroof beyond a reasonable
doubt and a unanimous verdict requirement appear to be complementary safeguards of
due process." Id. at 244. Prof. Larkin cites a juvenile case, It re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970), which holds, according to Larkin, "that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Larkin,
supra at 242. The rule permitting juries of fewer than twelve members, however, would
appear to constitute as much an erosion of the standard of reasonable doubt as the less-
than-unanimous verdict, and the Supreme Court has strongly implied that jury trial is
not necessary to insure the viability of "reasonable doubt" by holding that jury trials are
not constitutionally required in juvenile proceedings. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971).
Even if the unanimous verdict is an essential element of trial by jury and thus
mandatory where jury guarantees apply, there is little evidence that introduction of
unanimous verdicts would significantly interfere with military discipline. Larkin, supra
at 251-58. Although Prof. Larkin may understate the impact of hung juries on the
military, the increased expense of a small number of retrials would not seem sufficient
to outweigh the importance of granting servicemen their right to trial by jury. Several
bills which would require unanimous verdicts in the military have recently been intro-
duced in the House. H.R. 7263, 7292, 7467, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
123. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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ing a bad-conduct discharge 24 to conform to current standards for trial
by jury because of the serious nature of the potential penalty. 5 Since
the number of Army special courts-martial empowered to adjudge a
punitive discharge is relatively small, 28 requiring additional impartially
selected court members would cause little administrative inconvenience.
Navy, Marine and Air Force special courts-martial, however, are routinely
empowered to adjudge punitive discharges. If jury standards were
applied to the military, these courts would have to comply with federal
requirements or stop issuing punitive discharges.
Other administrative difficulties might be raised by the due process
requirement that members of all courts, whether or not the courts are
convened under the requirements of article III and the sixth amendment,
be chosen in an impartial manner. In fact, however, an impartial and
random selection system such as that used in the federal courts would
appear to be as easy or easier to administer than the current court
martial selection system which requires the convening authority per-
sonally to select those of his command who are "best qualified" for
court-martial duty. Its administration would also require less time and
manpower than the current, improper practice of delegating the selection
process to subordinates.
Initially, with a random system, an increased administrative burden
can be expected, since a more representative system could probably result
in more requests for jury trials.'27 However, despite some additional
manpower requirements and expenses, it is likely that the military can
successfully cope with this situation.
In assessing the effect of trial by a more representative and randomly-
selected jury upon discipline in the armed services, it is important to
recognize that there are two major categories of crimes tried by military
courts. The majority of cases involve purely military offenses such as
124. For the procedures currently required to convene a special court-martial cap-
able of adjudging a bad conduct discharge, see MANUAL, supra note 12. at ff 15(b).
See also art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819, which requires a "complete record of the proceedings
and testimony."
125. The Court of Military Appeals has held that a reviewing authority or lower
court on rehearing may substitute as much as one year's confinement for a bad conduct
discharge if the total confinement is not in excess of that which the court could have
given initially. Jones v. Ignatius. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 7, 39 C.M.R. 7 (1968) ; United States
v. Darusin, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 354, 43 C.M.R. 194 (1971). Although a special court-martial
is still limited to six months confinement, the cases emphasize the strong punitive nature
of a bad conduct discharge.
126. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
127. In 1968, 65 per cent of federal defendants who contested guilt exercised their
right to trial by jury. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 6 (1968).
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absence without leave, disobedience of orders and disrespect to superiors.
The second category of cases are civilian in nature and include such
offenses as theft, assault, and murder. In some cases the crimes may be
both military and civilian in nature, such as an assault upon an officer
by an enlisted man.
In O'Callahan v. Parker,12 the Supreme Court first considered
whether the demands of military discipline justified the practice of trying
servicemen by courts-martial for civilian offenses- The Court's primary
concern was the failure of courts-martial to provide trial by jury. In
O'Callahan an Army sergeant was charged with the assault and at-
tempted rape of a girl in a hotel in Honolulu. At the time of the offense
he was off duty and in civilian clothes. In determining whether there
was military jurisdiction to try the offense, the Court characterized
courts-martial as "a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which
military discipline is preserved.""' The Court added the "the justification
for such a system rests on the special needs of the military, and . .
expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain carries with it
a threat to liberty."' It went on to declare that unless an offense is
clearly "service-connected" the military has no authority to try the case
and concluded that the Army had no jurisdiction to try O'Callahan.
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and the Court of Military
Appeals have found disciplinary interests in a broad range of civilian
offenses thereby limiting the application of O'Callahan."3' Consequently,
most servicemen accused of civilian offenses are still tried under a system
which is designed to discipline persons accused of military offenses.
The argument that the needs of military discipline outweight the
128. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
129. Id. at 265.
130. Id.
131. The Court of Military Appeals has guarded military jurisdiction jealously by
giving a broad construction to the service connection test and limiting the situations in
which civilian offenses under O'Callahan must be tried in civilian courts. Situations still
considered service-connected include on-post offenses, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S.
355 (1971); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969); most
off-post drug offenses, United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275
(1969) ; offenses in which only servicemen are involved, United States v. Lovejoy, 20
U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970) ; and military rank is used to facilitate the crime,
United States v. Haagenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 332, 41 C.M.R. 332 (1970).
In United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969), the court held
that petty offenses are triable in military courts. Also, servicemen in Vietnam are
amenable to military jurisdiction for all crimes since no other United States court has
jurisdiction. Vietnam has waived jurisdiction under a Status of Forces of Agreement.
Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina, with France, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, Dec.
23, 1950, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 2756, T.I.A.S. No. 2447.
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right to trial by jury is somewhat stronger in regard to military offenses,
but it may not be sufficiently compelling to support the denial of jury
protections. The argument is simple: enlisted personnel serving as court
members will not understand the needs of military discipline and will
tend to acquit or give more lenient sentences to persons accused of
military offenses than would officers, senior non-commissioned officers,
or military judges. Therefore, enlisted personnel will commit more
military offenses and discipline will suffer. The argument has some
logical force but it rests on the unproven assumption that discipline is
best maintained by the threat of punishment. Furthermore, it underrates
the ability of the modem enlisted man to carry out his responsibilities
intelligently as a court member and misunderstands him as a potential
offender. It also fails to take into acconut the feelings of the average
enlisted man who will never come into contact with a court-martial.3 2
YOUNG ENLISTED MEN AS COURT MEMBERS
The modern armed forces is an educated and increasingly technical
society. Fewer than ten percent of Army servicemen have infantry
MOS's (Military Occupational Specialties), and perhaps another five
percent are in unskilled service occupations. 3 With a minimum of con-
stitutionally permitted screening'" and a liberal challenge procedure, 3 '
the enlisted ranks, including combat and infantry troops, can be expected
to produce jurors who understand issues, who will obey the law and the
instructions of the judge and who will fairly and honorably represent
the military community.
Although the presence of lower-ranked enlisted men on courts-
132. Prof. Edward F. Sherman notes that:
[C]riticism is often heard among enlisted men that the court martial is a
"kangaroo court" . . . Allowing enlistees to serve on courts-martial would go
a long way toward restoring their confidence in the military justice system.
Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REv.
25, 45 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Proposals].
133. In 1967, of 2,375,000 enlisted military personnel, 7.8 per cent bad infantry
MOS's. Another twelve per cent had service MOS's including motor transport, food and
security, and somewhat more than half of service MOS's would be semi-skilled.
AiSTRAcT, supra note 72, table 393, at 260. Infantry specialties call for more skill in
handling sophisticated weaponry than ever before, and despite the Vietnam war, basic
induction standards remain high. In 1969, only 55 per cent of draftees were found to
meet physical and mental standards for induction. Id., table 398, at 263.
134. A requirement of one year's prior service, for example, would be a valuable
selection device.
135. A minimum of three peremptory challenges would be desirable, with more
for serious offenses. Each party is currently entitled to one peremptory challenge in
both special and general courts-martial. UCMJ, art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1970).
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martial is rare, the author has appeared before four courts-martial'"6 in
which enlisted men in grades E-4 or E-5 or both were members. In
these cases the convening authority was persuaded that appointing young
enlisted men would be a useful experiment. Although it is impossible
to generalize, these cases seem to have much in common and to illustrate
the feasibility and desirability of participation by enlisted men of lower
ranks in courts-martial. After three of these cases the court members
discussed the factors which they considered in their deliberations.'8 7 They
indicated no reluctance *to convict once the government had met its
burden of proof. In all four cases it was obvious that the court members
took their duties seriously. They remained sharply attentive throughout
the trial, particularly during final argument and instructions. They all
took notes throughout the trial and asked intelligent questions of wit-
nesses. At no point did the court members give any indication that the
accused would be given special consideration because they were enlisted
men. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the testimony of com-
missioned and senior non-commissioned officers was given no greater
weight because of their rank.
Of these cases, that of United States v. Rollins,"' is particularly
instructive. Rollins was charged with assaulting a command sergeant
major and with refusing to identify himself. He was tried before a
special court-martial convened at Long Binh Post, Vietnam in October,
1971. The convening authority agreed to a defense request that the
members of the court be chosen at random without regard to rank. Using
social security numbers and dates of rotation from Vietnam as guides, the
staff judge advocate and a computer programmer came up with nine
nominees. The convening authority removed those who he felt did not
meet article 25(d) (2) criteria and those in essential jobs. The final
panel consisted of one major, one captain, one E-7 (a sergeant first class),
three E-5's, and three E-4's. After challenges the jury was reduced to
five members: two sergeants (E-5) and three specialists (one E-5 and
two E-4's). Although the selection process was not entirely random, the
convening authority demonstrated that courts can be randomly selected
136. United States v. Bell, U.S. Army Court-Martial Convening Order No. -
(1971) [on file at 35th Engineer Group, Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam]; United States v.
Rollins, U.S. Army Court-Martial Convening Order No. 63 (1971); United States v.
Woodmancy, U.S. Army Court-Martial Convening Order No. - (1971) [or file at
HQ, XXIV Corps, Danang, Vietnam]; United States v. Sayles, U.S. Navy Court-
Martial Convening Order No. - (1971) [on file at Naval Support Activity Group,
Saigon, Vietnam].
137. These members did not violate their oaths not to reveal the vote of any member.
138. See note 136 supra.
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consistent with the current provisions of the UCMJ.
At trial Rollins testified that he had been grabbed from behind and
had struck the sergeant major in instinctive self-defense. The sergeant
major denied ever having touched Rollins but admitted to having
signed a statement only hours after the event in which he had admitted
touching and grabbing Rollins before being struck. The jury deliberated
approximately one hour and returned a finding of not guilty as to both
charges. The jury then asked the judge for permission to explain its
findings and, without revealing individual votes, the members intelligently
discussed the facts of the case and the law as they understood it. The
judge later stated that the verdict was clearly "supported by the
evidence."' 39
Significantly, the convening authority in Rollins later agreed to
continue to use courts chosen at random with heavy enlisted representa-
tion. He indicated that the effect on discipline of any increase in leniency
with enlisted members might well be offset by increased enlisted respect
for the judicial process and for the service itself.
It is not unreasonable to expect that sentences for military offenses
might be somewhat lighter when adjudged by enlisted men who con-
tinuously face orders, some of them arbitrary in nature. Although some
jurors sympathetic to military needs might feel that an accused should
comply with all orders, much as the juror does himself, it is more likely
that enlisted men would have greater sympathy for other enlisted men
than would officers. But that is not to say that verdicts returned by
juries including significant numbers of lower ranked enlisted men would
not in fact be more just and wise than those returned by courts com-
prised of senior N.C.O.'s and officers. As Professor Edward F. Sherman
points out, objections to the influence of enlisted court members go to
the heart of the jury system itself :
Permitting an accused to be tried by a jury of his peers chosen
at random always involves the possibility that jurors will be
sympathetic to the accused, swayed by other members of the
jury, or that they will not appreciate the purposes and objectives
of the prosecution and the criminal laws. These qualities, how-
ever, are only objectionable if they prevent a juror from
viewing a case with an open mind, and they have a valuable
function in insuring trial by a jury whose members reflect the
different experiences, attitudes, and class prejudices found in
139. TImE, Nov. 8, 1971, at 83.
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the community. The court-martial comprised solely of officers
is especially lacking in these qualities. 4 '
Even if enlisted court members were more lenient towards enlisted
men than officers would be, what effect would such leniency have on
discipline? The majority of military offenses are committed in the heat
of the moment. Although at the time of committing an offense an
enlisted man may be aware that there are penalties for such actions, it
is unlikely that the possibility of a trial before a court-martial composed in
part of his peers would have any effect upon his actions.' 4' Few
soldiers actually see the effect of a court-martial sentence on a fellow
soldier. Commanders often place an accused whom they consider to
be a "trouble maker" in pre-trial confinement at the slightest provoca-
tion, thus isolating him from communication with members of his
unit. 42 Courts-martial often take two or three months from the com-
mission of the alleged offense to the time of verdict. After the trial the
offender is routinely transferred to another unit, regardless of the verdict.
Thus, the average enlisted man has little knowledge of the outcome
of court-martial trials and the sentences that are given. The presence
of enlisted men on courts would seem, if anything, to increase the com-
munication to others of the outcome of courts-martial and, in cases
where a conviction was obtained, of the punishment given.
The fact that commanders have broad powers to maintain discipline
without utilizing court-martial proceedings also would lessen any adverse
impact of increased enlisted participation. In addition to his own personal
140. CIVLIANIZATION, supra note 12, at 97. A simple remedy for those who fear
lighter sentences would be to place sentencing power in the hands of the judge. Such a
move should only be permitted if judges are given truly independent status.
141. As Prof. Larkin, a retired Navy captain, writes in assessing the effect of
unanimous verdicts on military discipline:
[T]he assertion that a person inclined toward a breach of discipline or in-
subordination would calculate so precisely his chances of escaping appropriate
punishment ignores modern studies in criminology and criminal psychology.
Larkin, supra note 122, at 256.
142. The Manual for Courts-Martial prohibits pretrial confinement unless necessary
to insure the presence of the accused at trial or because of the seriousness of the offense
charged. MANUAL, supra note 12, f 20(c). Although the Court of Military Appeals
has held that "seriousness of the offense" may be considered only insofar as an accused
might be tempted to flee, the court's decisions on factual situations have supported a far
less discriminating use of pretrial confinement. See, e.g., Horner v. Resor, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
285, 41 C.M.R. 285 (1970). At least one command has interpreted the phrase to permit
pretrial confinement for offenses which might "seriously affect discipline." HQ United
States Army Vietnam, Change 4, Supp. 1 to AR 27-10, 11 2-34(b) (1), June 21, 1971.
Commanders have also been known to add a spurious charge of "communicating a
threat" to an otherwise nonviolent disciplinary offense to ensure that an accused is
placed in pretrial confinement.
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powers of persuasion and leadership, the commander has available assign-
ment of an individual to more or less pleasant duties; withholding of
passes and privileges; granting of medals and letters of conmendation;
granting or preventing promotion; giving letters of reprimand; adjudging
company and field grade "nonjudicial punishment" ;14 and transfering
a troublemaker to another unit.' When all else fails, the commander
might institute elimination proceedings.' 45 Nonjudicial punishment under
article 15 of the UCMJ is an ideal disciplinary tool for a commander,
since he is both accuser and judge. Although an accused may consult
a military lawyer or retain civilian counsel, he has no right to have a
military lawyer appear at the hearing. Maximum punishments imposable
by company grade officers are up to seven days of correctional custody,
seven days forfeiture of pay, reduction one grade in rank, fourteen days
extra duty, fourteen days restriction, and fourteen days detention of
pay.'46 Field grade officers may impose somewhat higher penalties: for
example, a maximum of thirty days of correctional custody and reduc-
tion to the lowest enlisted pay grade.' 47 Although an accused may
decline to accept nonjudicial punishment and elect trial by court-martial,
nonjudicial punishment remains a powerful disciplinary tool. 4 '
There is, as Professor Sherman writes, "a certain anachronistic
ring to arguments that a commander needs to control courts-martial to
obtain instant and unthinking response from his men and that any
lessening of his powers would weaken his ability to maintain discipline." 4
Current reliance on the threat of court-martial may even have an adverse
effect on discipline. The attitudes of enlisted men towards the military
143. UCMJ, art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
144. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 12, ff 128(c).
145. These are proceedings to discharge a person from the armed forces with an
honorable, general or undesirable discharge. See generally DEP'T OF ARaMY, REG. 635-
212 (1966).
146. UCMJ, art. 15(b), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970). Seamen aboard ship may be
punished by a maximum of three days' confinement on bread and water as well.
147. UCMJ, art. 15(b), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970). Under normal circumstances,
an enlisted man above grade E-4 may not be reduced by more than one grade. MANUAL,
supra note 12, at 1 131(b).
148. UCMJ, art. 15(a), 10 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970). Although commanders do not
always refer a refused article 15 offense to court-martial, refusing the article 15 involves
the possibility of special court-martial proceedings, a risk which most servicemen do not
choose to take. In addition to the substantially increased penalties possible from a spe-
cial court-martial, the commanding officer can add other charges that might otherwise
have been overlooked.
149. Civilianization, supra note 12, at 92. The American soldier is more articulate,
skilled and educated than he has ever been. He is not the same man who fought in 1776,
and he does not respond in the same way to disciplinary measures. For a discussion of
the changing role of military discipline, see id. at 91-99. See also Larkin, supra note 122,
at 251-58.
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are often adversely affected by the actions of officers who attempt to
gain respect through the threat of court-martial punishment. It is not
unnatural to assume that threats alone can not maintain discipline. If,
in fact, representative courts-martial weaken the effectiveness of the
court-martial as a disciplinary tool, officers might be forced to rely more
on earning the respect of their men than on crude displays of their
court-martial powers. An officer who has the respect of his men and in
turn, treats them with respect would be in a far better position to accom-
plish his military mission than one who relies solely on the threat of
courts-martial.150
The current military justice system as a whole does not command
the highest respect either from the accused or from the great' number of
enlisted men who will never be chargd under the UCMJ. Lower-ranked
enlisted men complain, as did Justice Douglas in O'Callahat,"5' that the
court-martial system is a disciplinary tool of the commander and that
court members are there to do his bidding. Whether or not such com-
plains are correct is irrelevant to the enlisted man's obvious lack of
faith in the system. A fair representation of enlisted men, especially
if coupled with other reforms, would do much to gain the confidence
of lower rank servicemen in the military system of justice. It is logical
to assume that such confidence will result in an increased respect for the
military generally and a concomitant improvement of military discipline.
COURT SELECTION METHODS THAT MEET CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
It may be that the only effective means of insuring a serviceman's
right to trial by a jury of his peers is to transfer jurisdiction over all
crimes committed by servicemen to civilian courts. The transfer of
jurisdiction over certain civilian and military offenses to the federal
courts has been incorporated into reform proposals submitted by Senator
Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.) .. Congressman Charles Bennett (R.-Fla.) 53
and Senator Birch Bayh (D.-Ind.) have introduced bills calling for a
150. For a powerful story of discipline in any army whose officers had the respect
of their enlisted men, see E. S Now, RED STAR OVER CHINA (1938).
151. 395 U.S. at 265 (majority opinion).
152. S. 2183, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 821 (1971).
153. H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1259 (1971); S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 1259 (1971). Cong. Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (D.-Ohio) [H.R. 6901, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971)] and Charles M. Price (D.-Ill.) [H.R. 2196, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)]
have also introduced bills dealing with court selection. Their reforms in this area are
similar to the Bayh, Bennett and Hatfield bills for general courts-martial, but they would
leave special courts-martial essentially the same as in the present system. For further
discussion of all five bills see Proposals, siupra note 132.
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study of the desirability of transferring certain military cases to federal
court jurisdiction. The transfer of jurisdiction over some or all offenses
committed by servicemen to civilian courts would, however, create sub-
stantial administrative difficulties. Already overcrowded dockets would
become unmanageable and expenses would soar. Although a massive
infusion of funds could solve many of these difficulties, it would be far
more practical to reform the military courts substantially.
Another problem inherent in the grant of jurisdiction over civilian
offenses to civilian courts is that servicemen may well be tried by juries
less representative of his class than randomly selected court-martial
juries. The average civilian does not understand the problems of the
young enlisted man any more than a senior non-commissioned officer
would.
Although it may become necessary at some point to transfer juris-
diction over offenses by servicemen to civilian courts, much can be done
within the military system to increase the quality of justice by providing
representative courts. Some ways by which Congress could bring the
court-martial system into conformity with the jury guarantees of article
III and the sixth amendment and the incorporated equal protection
guarantees of the fifth amendment are discussed below.
In each of the methods to be discussed, it would be constitutionally
permissible and, perhaps, desirable to place some limit on the eligibility
of enlisted men and officers for service on courts. For example, the
provision in the Bayh bill that court members have a minimum of one
year's military service.54 appears reasonable. A year's exposure to the
needs of the service should provide sufficient understanding of the
military for intelligent service on a court martial, and, with the minimum
enlistment age at seventeen, it would insure that court members are at
least eighteen. Most drafted enlistd court members would be at least
twenty and probably 21 since most men are drafted at age 19Y."
In addition, regulations could be promulgated exempting a class or
154. S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 825 (1971).
155. Although 19Y years is less than the current minimum age for civilian juries,
eighteen year old voters have been added to jury rolls in many areas due to extension of
the vote and other rights to eighteen year olds. See "Teens May Soon Be Serving on
Juries with Parent," Herald-Telephone (Bloomington, Indiana), Oct. 24, 1971, p. 1, col. 1.
Under the "lottery" system, selective service registrants first receive a lottery number in
the year in which they turned 19 and are not subjct to draft until the following year.
Regulations to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, as amended, 32 CFR
#1631.5(d). The median age for the armed services in 1969 was 22.7. Selected Man-
power Statistics, Department of Defense, Directorate of Information Operations, 15
April 1970, p. 31. In 1969 the median age of Army enlistees was 22.7 years of age.
Selected Manpower Statistics, Dep't of Defense (1970).
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classes of personnel (such as military police or doctors in a war zone)
whose members should not serve because of the likelihood of bias or
because their duties are presumptively essential to the military mission.'56
The commander of the court-martial jurisdiction involved could be given
a list of names chosen by one of the methods discussed below in advance
of trial. He could then excuse those members who were engaged in
duties so essential to the military mission that they could not be made
available for trial. A list of those excused and the reasons for excusing
them could be given to the military judge and made available for
inspection by counsel for both sides. Finally, a liberal voir dire 57 policy
coupled with an increase in the number of peremptory challenges"
8
would enable both the government and the defense to eliminate officers
and enlisted men thought to be lacking in the qualifications for service
on a particular court-martial. So long as the number remaining on the
court after challenges exceeded a statutory minimum, those remaining
would constitute the court:" 9
Random Selection From a Pool Consisting of all Eligible
Officers and Enlisted Men in the Court-Martial Jurisdiction
The method is essentially that proposed by Senator Bayh and
Representative Bennett. The names of eligible officers and enlisted men
would be placed in a common pool and names would be drawn at random.
Those remaining after challenges would constitute the court. This method
would most likely produce a court heavily weighted towards lower-ranked
enlisted men who constitute the major population of any military juris-
diction. It is possible, moreover, that some courts chosen by this method
would include no officers. Courts selected from a common pool would,
however, certainly meet the strictest interpretation of requirements of
article III, the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
Random Selection from Separate Pools of
Eligible Officers and Enlisted Men With a
Predeterminded Ratio of Officers to Enlisted Men
156. HQ I Field Force Vietnam, Staff Memorandum 27-1, Feb. 21, 1971, excludes
legal officers, officers in the Military Police Corps, chaplains, medical officers and
nurses, inspectors general and some senior staff positions. Id. at f[ 4(a).
157. An individual voir dire, permitted by most military judges, is essential and
should be made a matter of right.
158. A minimum of three peremptories is desirable. UCMJ, art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C..
§ 841(b) (1970), provides for only one such challenge.
159. A minimum of ten to twelve members for a general court and four or five for-
a special court-martial would be desirable, although apparently not required constitu--
tionally.
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Under this system two separate pools would be created, one con-
sisting of all eligible officers and the other of all eligible enlisted men.
Either an enlisted/officer ratio for the initial panel or a minimum per-
centage (perhaps fifty per cent) 6 o of enlisted personnel on the final court
would be established. Senator Hatfield's bill calls for one-half enlisted
men on the court, but his bill would retain the present requirement of
article 25(d) (1) that when it can be avoided no member be junior in
rank to the accused. There is some question whether this provision is
constitutionally permissible in a system where right to trial by jury is
recognized. Equal protection problems remain when officers can be tried
exclusively by fellow officers, while enlisted men are tried by both
officers and enlisted men. The community also has a stake in having
juries representative of a broad cross section of its people. The interests
of justice and society may not be served, for example, when a banker
accused of defrauding small depositors is tried by a jury of bankers or
persons in his general income bracket. Yet under the current system
and even after substantial reforms like the Hatfield bill, a sergeant major
charged with assaulting a private can be assured that no young enlisted
men will sit in judgment of him.
The rationale behind forbidding subordinates from serving on the
jury of a superior is that subordinates might have a bias against superiors
which would influence their decision. But it seems no more likely that
subordinates would unfairly judge superiors than that superiors, many
of whom view disciplinary offenses as a direct challenge to their authority,
would unfairly judge subordinates. Although Senator Hatfield's bill is
far-reaching in comparison to the present system, it clearly maintains
the decided and unfair advantage to officers and senior enlisted men
of securing juries of their peers."
Civilian courts do not permit the deliberate selection of a number
of jurors from middle and upper income brackets equivalent to the
160. Providing only fifty per cent enlisted men would still fail to reflect their rela-
tive percentage weight in the armed forces. For the years 1968, 1969 and 1970, the com-
bined enlisted strength was over 85 per cent of the total strength of all services com-
bined. Dep't of Defense, Office of Ass't Sec'y for Econ. Opportunity, Negro Partici-
pation in the Armed Forces by Grade (mimeo. 1971).
161. The Hatfield bill also gives an accused officer or enlisted man the right to a
court of which at least half the members are of the same rank or grade, if he so requests.
It is questionable whether this provision would provide lower ranked enlisted men with
more members in their grade than would be provided by the random selection method.
Only senior N.C.O.'s and officers, who form a small part of the military community,
would be favored by adding this provision to the excellent random selection portion of
the bill. The Constitution requires only that persons of the defendant's rank not be
systematically excluded, and there does not seem to be any legitimate advantage to
military justice in providing any accused such a special jury.
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fifty per cent representation of officers, but 'the practical result of most
jury selection systems is the selection of predominantly middle class and
middle-aged jurors. A percentage method may have somewhat the
same effect since by permitting fifty per cent to be officers there is a
greater likelihood of under-representation of peers of younger enlisted
personnel and a lower representation of blacks on the courts. Many
officers come from above average economic classes, and only a small
percentage of officers is black' 62 To justify such a result a court would
have to rely on military necessity, but military necessity must be invoked
with far more logical force that it has had in the past. Although there
is an unfortunate tendency among military apologists to be satisfied
with inequities because the civilian systems do no better, limiting officer
membership to fifty per cent under a random selection would be a
significant step forward.
Selection of Courts by a Jury Commissioner Under Appropriate
Criteria .Similar to Those Used by Many State Jury Commissions
A third possibility is the appointment of a military jury commis-
sioner to select personnel who meet specific criteria, such as that approved
in Carter v. Jury Commissioner.6 ' Under this method, Congress would
have to specify a cross-section of ranks to prevent the commissioner from
leaning heavily towards senior personnel as under the present system.
This selection process, however, would put some of the potential for
abuse that the convening authority has under the present system in the
hands of the jury commissioner. It would appear to have no legitimate
advantages to the accused or to those concerned with discipline and
would probably be more expensive and difficult to administer than a
random system. The difficulty of establishing proper criteria and of
enforcing the use of those criteria by the commissioners would also lead
to otherwise unnecessary litigation. Although a commissioner system
would probably withstand constitutional attack, it would seem far less
desirable than a random selection system.
162. In 1968, only 3.3 per cent of Army officers were black. In 1969, the per-
centage was 3.2, and in 1970 this increased to 3.4 per cent. For the combined branches
of the armed forces, the relevant percentages were 2.1 per cent in 1968; 2.1 per cent in
1969 and 2.2 per cent in 1970. Dep't of Defense, Office of Ass't Sec'y for Econ. Oppor-
tunity, Negro Participation in the Armed Forces by Grade (mimeo. 1971). At the same
time, 12.6 per cent of enlisted men in the Army were black in 1968; 10.7 per cent in
1969 and 13.5 per cent in 1970. Id. Women would also be underrepresented although
primarily because they represent such a small group in the military community. As of
December 31, 1969, there were only 39,506 women in all the services combined. ASTRAscr,
supra note 72, table 388, at 258.
163. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
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A Dual System, Employing Courts Fully Meeting Constitutional
Standards for the Trial of Civilian and Serious Military Crimes
and Courts Held to Lesser Sfandards for the Trial of
Military Offenses
The distinction between military and civilian offenses in military
law permits a great deal of flexibility in applying the guarantees of jury
trial to accused servicemen. Since the interest of the military is greatest
where military offenses are involved, a dual system would permit the
military some disciplinary control over such offenses, while insuring the
accused greater rights to trial by jury for civilian offenses. The branch
of a dual system which would try civilian offenses and military offenses
in which a punitive discharge or a sentence of more than six months is
sought would comply with the jury-selection requirements of federal
courts. The single-pool randomly selected jury, such as that discussed
above, would clearly meet those standards.
The disciplinary branch of the dual system would be special courts-
martial for the trial of military offenses only without the power to adjudge
either a punitive discharge or confinement in excess of six months.
Members would be chosen as they are today or with a set ratio of
officers to enlisted men. Alternatively a randomly selected judge could
sit alone at the option of the accused. Conviction in a disciplinary court,
while remaining part of a serviceman's record, would not be considered
criminal in nature and would be treated as nonjudicial punishment.
Since the jury provisions of the Constitution do not now apply to courts
which are not empowered to adjudge sentences in excess of six months,
trial by judge alone would be constitutional.
Since most military crimes are currently tried before a special
court-martial, the major change under a dual system relying on special
courts for trial of military offenses would be the disciplinary court's
nonjudicial characterization and its inability to adjudge a bad conduct
discharge. One solution to the loss of power in disciplinary special courts-
martial to separate convicted servicemen would be to permit courts to
award honorable or general administrative discharges. These courts
would be required to conform to the rules of evidence and procedure of
judicial courts. If a prosecutor believed a punitive discharge or more than
six months' confinement were warranted, he could refer the case to trial
before a general court-martial with a constitutional jury. Trial by special
court-martial with a constitutional jury would also be available for
228
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civilian crimes.' Those crimes which are both civilian and military in
nature, such as an assault upon an officer, could be tried in either type
of court.'
There seems to be no legitimate justification for the current practice
of adjudging federal felony convictions without the benefit of a consti-
tutional jury. Since the disciplinary courts would be nonjudicial in
nature, no criminal record would be maintained. If a prosecutor felt an
offense were serious enough to merit a criminal record, he could refer
the case to a constitutional jury.
There are, however, significant disadvantages to a dual system of
military courts. Chief among these disadvantages is the likelihood that
commanders will take advantage of treduced critical scrutiny over dis-
ciplinary courts and pack them with conviction-minded members. Unless
a random selection were required, court packing would probably be far
more of a problem than it is today. It should be remembered that military
offenses outnumbered civilian offenses. In turn, a great deal of bitterness
about military justice comes from those who feel "railroaded" for
committing a disciplinary offense. Although the inability of a disciplinary
court to adjudge punitive discharges or confinement in excess of six
months would tend to ameliorate these feelings, it would have the salutory
effect on morale that representative enlisted participation on those courts
would bring. As a practical matter a court composed of one half randomly
selected enlisted men would be highly desirable in the disciplinary courts.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
O'Callahan marks the first recognition by the Supreme Court that
servicemen may be entitled to the protections of article III and the fifth
and sixth amendments in relation to trial by jury. As in previous
decisions, however, the Court gave scant attention to the practical
problems involved in attempting to resolve the tension between the war
powers of Congress and the President on the one hand and the judicial
164. The same appellate system could be used for all courts. Some provision would
have to be enacted by which higher courts could interpret law for the disciplinary courts.
The accused would be afforded the same procedural rights and right to counsel as he
now receives.
165. The Bennett bill would set up specific areas of jurisdiction for "upper" and
"lower" courts similar to the present general and special courts-martial. The decision as
to which court tries a case is not in the commander's hands. Jurisdiction over civilian
crimes would only be allowed outside the United States. The Hatfield bill would limit
the military to jurisdiction over eighteen military offenses, transferring all other crimes
to federal jurisdiction. Both bills would require random selection within the military
courts. See Proposals, supra note 133, at 28-33.
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requirements of article III and the fifth and sixth amendments on the
other. The Constitution contains neither a clear grant of jury
trial to members of the armed services nor a clear denial. The history
of article III and the sixth amendment and the history of military
practice in the late eighteenth century is not particularly helpful. Although
most civilian crimes were tried by civilian courts, a number of defendants
were apparently brought before military tribunals without a jury of
peers. To resolve the question of military juries one must ultimately
look to the fundamental importance of the right of trial by jury and to
the changing disciplinary needs of the military.
In light of both the vast social changes taking place in the civilian
and military sectors of American, society and the changes which have
had and will continue to have profound effect upon military discipline,
suggestions that reform in court selection will lead to the downfall of
military discipline are no longer persuasive. No convincing evidence has
been presented that military discipline will collapse or even suffer notice-
ably if juries are chosen in a fair and representative manner.
There is a wide range of options available to Congress to fashion a
constitutionally acceptable system of jury selection along the lines
indicated above. The simplest way of assuring servicemen their right to
trial by jury would be to provide for random selection without regard to
rank of all jurors for the trial of civilian and military offenses in the
military courts. The dual system of special courts-martial, however, may
well stand as the best means of assuring the serviceman his constitu-
tional right to trial by jury, while satisfying the demands of the military
for significant officer representation. Although nonrepresentative juries
in nonjudicial disciplinary courts with limited sentencing power could
conceivably be upheld under the doctrine of military necessity, fairness
dictates that the disciplinary courts be composed of at least one-half
randomly selected enlisted men. A desirable system would include fully
representative juries in both general courts-martial and civilian offense
special courts-martial, while juries including one-half randomly selected
enlisted men would sit on disciplinary courts. The advantages such a
dual military system offers the accused are obvious. For a serious crime he
has the right to trial by a jury of his peers. For minor military offenses
he has at least a number of his peers as jurors.
The advantages to the military are also significant. The major
advantage is simply one of military prestige. Recognition of a service-
man's right to trial by a jury of peers would be a great credit to the
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armed forces when, as now, they are seeking to improve their image and
to attract volunteers. Further, a dual system could lead to a solution of
many of the problems created by O'Callahan. A constitutionally proper
military jury would be an important step towards improving the military
justice system and might render extension of civilian court jurisdiction
over military offenses unnecessary. O'Callahan does not require civilian
courts to take jurisdiction over military offenders; it merely denies
military jurisdiction because of the substantial defects in military justice.
If representative juries did cause some loss of discipline, it would be
a small price to pay for applying the critical right of trial by jury to the
three million American citizens entrusted with protecting all of the
rights and duties created by the Constitution. Rather than reducing
discipline, however, randomly-selected and representative juries might
well play a significant role in increasing the integrity and effectiveness of
the American armed services.
